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EDITOR'S PREFACE 
The following four articles were prepared in anticipation of the 
Twelfth Annual Regional Meeting of the American Society of Inter-
national Law, which was to have been held at the Syracuse Univer-
sity College of Law on April 5, 1975. Unfortunately, a paralyzing 
snowstorm on the weekend of the meeting forced a cancellation of 
the proceedings. 
The four papers published in this issue outline the proposed 
discussion. The remarks of Mr. Sassoon were prepared as an intro-
duction to a session on the necessary role of international financial 
institutions, while the article by Dean Alnasrawi which follows was 
scheduled as the keynote, presenting his overview of the petrodollar 
problem. Professor Pattillo, originally scheduled as a member of the 
panel discussing petromoney investment problems in the United 
States and elsewhere, subsequently submitted an analysis of bal-
ance of payments problems generated by the new petrofunds. Com-
pleting this section is the presentation scheduled to open the after-
noon session, an analysis by Professor Herzog of the response of the 
"European Community" to the petromoney imbalance. The eco-
nomic analyses of these articles, especially those of Mr. Sassoon and 
Dean Alnasrawi, are based upon data available at the time of con-
ference. 
The College of Law International Law Society would like to 
express its appreciation to those persons yet unmentioned who had 
graciously agreed to attend the Twelfth Annual Regional Meeting: 
Associate Professor Jon E. Bischel; Pierre De Ravel D'Esclapon, 
Esq.; James G. Evans, Jr., Esq.; Associate Professor George M. 
Frankfurter; Professor L.F.E. Goldie; Assistant Professor Douglass 
J. Klein; Professor Eric Lawson; Howard Mennell, Esq.; Lester 
Nurick, Esq.; and James E. Price, Esq. 
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THE PETRODOLLAR ENERGY CRISIS: AN 
OVERVIEW AND INTERPRETATION 
Abbas Alnasra wi * 
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Any meaningful analysis of the current petrodollar situation 
requires an understanding of the evolution of relationships between 
oil companies and the governments of the oil producing countries 
during the first half of this century, due to the great influence these 
relationships have had on the present situation. 
A. The Concession Agreements 
Traditionally, oil producing countries had to deal individually 
with the oil companies operating in their territories regarding var-
ious aspects of oil production. Once an oil concession had been 
obtained, the host government had no control over the development 
of oil resources nor over the price at which oil was sold. Its role was 
confined to that of a mere recipient of a stipulated sum of money 
per unit of output. In the oil producing countries of the Middle East, 
these concessions were obtained by one or more of the seven major 
international oil corporations: Exxon, Texaco, Mobil, Gulf, Stan-
dard Oil of California (Socal), British Petroleum (BP), and Royal 
Dutch-Shell Group (Shell). In the early part of this century, these 
major firms obtained, either individually or jointly, the concession 
agreements which gave them virtually total control over the oil re-
sources in the Middle East. Thus, in Iran, BP was the sole operator 
of that country's oil industry until 1951. In Kuwait, the concession 
was obtained by Gulf and BP. In Iraq and Abu Dhabi, the groups 
included all the majors except Texaco and Socal. In Saudi Arabia, 
the concession was obtained first by Socal, which later admitted 
Texaco, Exxon, and Mobil. Oil operations in each country were 
carried out by a subsidiary owned by the major firms. The main 
features of these concessions may be summarized as follows: 
1. The duration of the concession extended over several de-
cades. Thus, the concession of Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) was 
to last from 1925 to the year 2000; Aramco's concession period was 
60 years from 1933; Kuwait Oil Company (KOC) had a concession 
*Associate Dean and Professor of Economics, College of Arts and Sciences, University 
of Vermont. 
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for 75 years from 1934; Iran's original concession was to last 60 years 
from 1933. 
2. The concessions covered either most of the territory of the 
state (for example, Iran and Saudi Arabia) or the state's entire 
territory (for example, Iraq, Kuwait, and Abu Dhabi). In comment-
ing on these two features, Professor Stocking wrote that "never in 
modern times have governments granted so much to so few for so 
long." 1 
3. In return for these privileges the governments were, as men-
tioned earlier, the recipients of a fixed amount of revenue per unit 
of output. 
The asymmetry between the rights and obligations of the oil 
companies can be explained by a number of historical facts, two of 
which stand out as the most important. First, the oil companies 
were backed by the military presence and/or the political power of 
their home governments. The IPC concession, for example, was ob-
tained at a time when Iraq was under the British Mandate, and 
Kuwait was a British protectorate when the concession was granted 
to BP and Gulf. Second, aside from the British influence in the 
Middle East, the governments, or more precisely the ruling oligar-
chies, lacked virtually any knowledge of the importance of oil or its 
relevance to their economies. Nor had they any significant knowl-
edge of the workings of the international oil industry. 2 In Iran, long 
a pawn in the international rivalries of Russia and Great Britain, 
the monarchy which granted the concession was described by Sir 
Arthur H. Hardinge as "an old, long-mismanaged estate, ready to 
be knocked down at once to whatever foreign power bid highest or 
threatened most loudly its degenerate and defenseless rulers."3 In 
Saudi Arabia, the concession was granted by a ruler who was de-
scribed as "not a modern or medieval man but the last of the great 
figures of the Old Testament."4 Even in the absence of military 
presence and political domination, the two parties to the concession 
1. G. STOCKING, MIDDLE EAST OIL: A STUDY IN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONTROVERSY 130 
(1970). 
2. According to N. al-Pachachi, in 1935 Iraq's oil department was run by a director, who 
did not have a high school diploma, and a junior clerk. As late as 1951, when Iraq negotiated 
its 1952 profit sharing agreement with IPC, no one had heard of posted prices, not to mention 
technical and economic studies. al-Pachachi, The Development of Concession Arrangements 
and Taxation in the Middle East, MIDDLE EAST ECONOMIC SURVEY SUPP., Mar. 29, 1968 
[Middle East Economic Survey will hereinafter be cited as MEES]. 
3. A. HARDINGE, A DIPLOMATIST IN THE EAST 280 (1928), quoted in G. STOCKING, supra note 
1, at 123. 
4. Id. 
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agreements were far from equal in their bargaining power or knowl-
edge of the oil industry, as well as in their understanding of the 
intricate workings of the modern multinational corporations or the 
complexity of legal documents framed by attorneys skilled in corpo-
rate and contract law.5 
Given the long term consequences of this disparity in bargain-
ing power and knowledge, the political and economic consequences 
of the Great Depression and World War II, the rising importance of 
Middle Eastern oil to the world economy, and the enormous profits 
which the oil companies were able to accumulate and transfer to 
their home countries, the people of the Middle East came to view 
the concession agreements as instruments which deprived them of 
an equitable share in their own wealth. Hence, it was inevitable that 
conflicts should arise. The points of conflict focused on the size of 
the area under concession, the duration and exclusive nature of the 
concessions, pricing and output policies, government revenues, cost 
accounting methods, the surrender of rights of taxation, fixity of 
legal terms, settlement of disputes, and the sovereignty of a foreign 
oil enclave within a sovereign state. 
B. The International Petroleum Cartel 
Long before the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) became known to the world, the international oil industry 
was dominated by seven vertically integrated major companies (the 
majors) which controlled over 90 percent of the world oil production 
outside the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics and the bulk of its transportation, refining, and marketing facil-
ities. The American majors were also in control of a sizable part of 
the American oil industry. As early as 1928, the dominant majors 
(Exxon, BP, and Shell) entered into cartel arrangements to elimi-
nate competitive pricing by fixing market shares, controlling output 
growth from various sources, exchanging oil to lessen cross-hauling, 
agreeing whether to eliminate or bring in competitors to the cartel 
system, and ultimately agreeing to sell crude oil and products at a 
fixed price regardless of source or production cost. Prices at the U.S. 
Gulf Coast terminals, as published by Platt's Oilgram, constituted 
the basis for price quotations throughout the world. In order to 
integrate the American oil output with the cartel's policy to regulate 
world output to maintain prices, an attempt was made to have the 
5. Id. at 125-26. 
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U.S. Government regulate output. Failing that, the industry per-
suaded oil producing states to adopt a series of regulations control-
ling oil production. The state regulatory agencies were empowered 
to prorate the estimated demand for crude oil among all producing 
fields and wells. Demand was estimated on the basis of current 
prices, so that additional production would not undermine the exist-
ing price structure. 6 The Connally Hot Oil Act7 enforced state regu-
lations by prohibiting interstate sales of crude oil produced in viola-
tion of state restrictions. 11 Thus, the prorating mechanism which 
stabilized U.S. crude prices served at the same time to stabilize 
prices throughout the world, since U.S. Gulf Coast prices were the 
prices at which oil was sold on the international market. It is inter-
esting to note in this connection the anomaly in this situation that 
consumers in Iraq were charged prices based upon quotations at the 
U.S. Gulf Coast, regardless of the facts that (a) the crude oil was 
produced in Iraq; (b) it was produced at low cost; (c) it was refined 
in a nearby refinery; and (d) the products were marketed by a local 
company.9 
The majors which sought an orderly development of oil produc-
tion through market allocation and pric_e stabilization were able to 
solidify their control through the utilization of two important de-
vices. The first was the joint ownership of producing companies in 
the oil producing countries in the Middle East and Venezuela. This 
technique could not but help the majors to coordinate and control 
output. Second, in order to allow new oil to enter the world market 
through the majors' integrated channels, long term contracts were 
concluded between certain majors. The provisions of these con-
tracts, which specified where such crude was to be marketed and the 
terms of its sale, had the effect of tightening the joint control of the 
majors over the international oil industry. 
C. Forces of Change 
A number of significant developments which took place in the 
6. Ao Hoc COMM. ON THE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL MONETARY EFFECT OF ENERGY AND 
OTHER NATURAL RESOURCE PRICING, HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 930 CONG., 2D 
SESS., OIL IMPORTS AND ENERGY SECURITY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT SITUATION AND FUTURE 
PROSPECTS 70 (Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter cited as OIL IMPORTS AND ENERGY SECURITY]. 
7. Interstate Transportation of Petroleum Products Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 715-7151 (1970). 
8. OIL IMPORTS AND ENERGY SECURITY, supra note 6. 
9 . SuecoMM. ON MONOPOLY, SENATE SELECT CoMM. ON SMALL BusINESS, 820 CoNG., 2o 
SESS., THE INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM CARTEL: STAFF REPORT OF THE FED. TRADE COMM'N 95 
(Comm. Print 1952) [hereinafter cited as THE INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM CARTEL] . 
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1950's had the effect of first solidifying the control of the majors over 
the world oil industry, but at the same time undermining it, and 
thus altering the pattern of relationship between the companies and 
the governments. 
In the final stages of World War II, it became clear that the 
United States would no longer continue to be a major exporter of 
oil. It also became clear that Europe would need increasing amounts 
of oil for the rebuilding of its economies, and the only major region 
capable of meeting these oil needs was the Middle East. The Middle 
East was also to be called upon to meet the rising needs of other 
parts of the Eastern Hemisphere, especially the phenomenal 
increase the Japanese demand for oil. In order to forestall an unre-
gulated growth of that region's output, a treaty between the govern-
ments of the United States and the United Kingdom was concluded 
in 1944. 10 The Anglo-American Oil Agreement had, broadly speak-
ing, two major objectives: (1) to enable U.S. oil companies to have 
more access to Middle East oil; and (2) to recommend how supply 
could be correlated with demand so as to further the orderly conduct 
of the international petroleum trade. 
Given the fact that there was more Middle East oil than there were 
markets for it, it was obvious that production allocations were going 
to be made .... The problem, therefore, was not whether but who 
would control that international allocation mechanism. As it turned 
out, the failure of the Anglo-American Oil Agreement delegated this 
global function to the major international oil companies.11 
In 1946, the Venezuelan government decreed an income tax of 
50 percent on the difference between cost and sale price of oil, a 
precedent which was to be followed in the Middle East in later 
years. In the same year, Exxon concluded that its sources of oil in 
the Western Hemisphere would not be sufficient to meet its market 
needs in the Eastern Hemisphere. Because of the fact that Aramco's 
oil was cheaper and because of the fear that its owners (Socal and 
Texaco) would use it to build their own facilities, Exxon and Mobil 
came to the conclusion that Socal and Texaco should be persuaded 
to use their marketing facilities in return for a piece of Aramco. In 
10. Petroleum Agreement Between the United States and Great Britain, done Aug. 8, 
1944, U.S.C. CoNG. SERVICE, 78TH CONG., 2D SEss. 1404, 1405-08 (1944). 
11. SUBCOMM. ON MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS, SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 
93i> CONG., 2D SESS., MULTINATIONAL OIL CORPORATIONS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 42-43 
(Comm. Print 1975) [hereinafter cited as MULTINATIONAL OIL CORPORATIONS AND U.S. FOREIGN 
POLICY]. 
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a rather complicated transaction concluded in 1947, Exxon received 
30 percent and Mobil 10 percent interests in Aramco for $102 million 
plus $125 million for similar interests in the Trans Arabian Pipeline 
(Tapline), which brings Arabian crude to the Mediterranean. By 
joining forces with Socal and Texaco, Exxon and Mobil were able 
not only to eliminate a serious potential disruption, but also to set 
the stage for the phenomenal growth of Saudi Arabian oil output. 12 
In 1950, Aramco concluded an agreement with the Saudi gov-
ernment which allowed the government to impose a 50 percent in-
come tax rate on Aramco's profits. In 1951, the government of Dr. 
Mossadegh nationalized the Iranian oil industry following a bitter 
dispute with BP. The nationalization measures and the Aramco-
Saudi agreement prompted the operating companies in Iraq and 
Kuwait to adopt the 50/50 profit sharing arrangements with certain 
modifications. 
The Iranian nationalization crippled its economy since Iran was 
unable to attract any buyer for its oil. Output declined from 700,000 
barrels a day (BD) in 1950 to 28,000 BD in 1952. The international 
oil cartel was very successful in its boycott of the nationalized oil. 
The loss of Iranian oil to BP was offset by increasing output in Iraq, 
Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. In 1953, the government of Dr. Mossad-
egh was overthrown and a year later a consortium of oil companies 
re-entered Iran. While BP was the sole proprietor of the concession 
before 1951, its equity share in the new consortium was reduced to 
40 percent, with the remaining 60 percent distributed among the 
five American majors (35 percent), Shell (14 percent), Compagnie 
Fran<;aise des Petroles (CFP) (six percent), and the other five per-
cent given to a small group of independent American oil 
companies. 13 
The seven majors together with CFP in 1954 had control over 
95 percent of the oil produced in Iran and Iraq and 100 percent of 
the oil produced in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. This position of con-
12. The Aramco concession has been fabulously profitable. Aramco's net income in 1973 
was $3.3 billion, of which $2.6 billion was paid as dividends to its four American owners. 
Exxon's share of the dividend was $789 million, or 32 percent of Exxon's total earnings of $2.4 
billion. See Hearings on Multinational Oil Corporations and United States Foreign Policy 
Before the Subcomm . on Multinational Corporations of the Senate Comm. on Foreign 
Relations, 93d Cong. , 2d Sess., pt. 7, at 206, 232 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on 
Multinational Oil Corportations and United States Foreign Policy]. In 1974, Exxon earned 
$3.1 billion, a 28 percent increase over 1973. See PETROLEUM INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY, Feb. 3, 
1975, at 6 [Petroleum Intelligence Weekly will hereinafter be cited as PIW]. 
13'. See G. STOCKING, supra note 1, at 157-58; MULTINATIONAL OIL CORPORATIONS AND U .S . 
FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 11, at 72-73. 
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trol enabled the majors to reintroduce the Iranian oil into the world 
market by slowing growth elsewhere in the region. Given the fact 
that, by 1954, oil had already become an indispensable source of 
current and developmental revenue for oil producing countries, it 
was clear that the majors were in a strong position to exert enormous 
power over the economic and political destiny of these countries. It 
should be remembered that in any negotiation or confrontation, 
each of the producing countries was forced to face a most powerful 
cartel, one that was in turn backed by the diplomatic and military 
forces of its members' home governments. 
While the 1954 Iranian consortium agreement had the effect of 
strengthening the position of the majors, other developments had 
the opposite effect. These developments include the entry of new-
comers offering better fiscal and other terms to host governments, 
the re-entry of Soviet oil into the world market to compete with oil 
from conventional sources on nonconventional terms (barter and 
non-dollar payments), and the emergence in producing countries of 
oil technocrats who were able to question some of the operational 
principles and practices of the oil companies. By the mid-1950's, oil 
imports had become a significant element in the U.S. market. Given 
the existence of the prorating system, the percent of production in 
Texas, for example, had to be reduced from 100 percent in 1948 to 
63 percent in 1950, and to 47 percent in 1957 when import quotas 
were imposed on a voluntary basis. 14 In 1959, the import quota sys-
tem was made mandatory to preserve the prorating system and to 
maintain domestic prices above foreign crude prices. The import 
controls insured not only that most U.S. needs would be met from 
domestic sources, but that most incremental demand would be met 
from these sources as well. The quota system had several important 
consequences. These included the denial of an opportunity to oil 
producing countries to expand output (especially Venezuela, which 
had become dependent on U.S. oil needs), the depletion of U.S. oil 
reserves, and the transfer of income from oil consumers to oil produ-
cers within the United States due to the higher prices of U.S. oil. 15 
14. Ao Hoc COMM. ON THE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL MONETARY EFFECT OF ENERGY AND 
OTHER NATURAL RESOURCES PRICING, HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 930 CONG., 2D 
SESS., DEVEWPING COUNTRIES AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE WORLD ECONOMY: PROBLEMS AND 
PROSPECTS 66 (Comm . Print 1974) [hereinafter cited as DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE 
UNITED STATES IN THE WORLD ECONOMY] . 
15. P . ODELL, OIL AND WORLD POWER: A GEOGRAPHICAL INTERPRETATION ch. 2 (1970). It 
was estimated that in 1969 consumers paid about $5 billion more for oil products than they 
would have paid in the absence of import restrictions. See CABINET TASK FORCE ON OIL IMPORT 
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One of the most important ramifications of the U.S. import control 
system for the international oil industry was its impact on the be-
havior of the newcomers. These oil firms entered the world market 
in the 1950's in order to insure crude supplies for their own refineries 
in the United States and elsewhere. Once the U.S. market was 
closed in 1959, it was only logical that they would sell their low cost 
crude at less than the majors' posted prices. Although the market 
outside the majors' control was narrow, it was still wide enough to 
exert a downward pressure on world prices outside the United 
States. This and the re-entry of Soviet oil forced the majors to sell 
their own oil to nonaffiliates at a discount in order to protect their 
market shares and to expand them if possible. But to sell at less 
than the posted prices and to compute government revenue at the 
posted prices meant that the majors were forced to accept less than 
50 percent of the profits. From the majors' point of view, this situa-
tion was unsustainable. In other words, the governments had to 
absorb part of the discount by having to accept lower per barrel 
revenue. Thus, in February 1959, the majors announced a reduction 
of 18 cents per barrel in the posted price of Middle East crudes (from 
$2.08 for Arabian oil), followed by another reduction of 10 cents per 
barrel in August 1960 (from $1.90 for the same oil). These reductions 
had the effect of reducing the per barrel revenue for Arabian oil from 
82 cents in 1955 to 75 cents in 1960, or a drop of nine percent. It is 
obvious that no government would willingly tolerate such a situa-
tion in which foreign enterprise unilaterally determines the size of 
its revenue. These arbitrary price cuts served as a warning to the 
oil producing countries that, in the absence of cooperation among 
themselves, further reductions in the posted prices could take place, 
thereby endangering their current budgets and development pro-
grams. 
D. Prices and Profits Before OPEC 
Posted prices (prices published by oil companies at a seaboard 
terminal) became, with the adoption in the early 1950's of the profit 
sharing agreements, the basis for computing company income and 
government revenues. The setting of these posted prices was the 
exclusive prerogative of the companies; the other exclusive preroga-
tive, it will be recalled, was the control of output. As the Middle 
East's low-cost output began to rise, in order to enable it to pene-
CONTROL, THE OIL IMPORT QUESTION: A REPORT ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF OIL IMPORTS TO THE 
NATIONAL SECURITY 22 (1970). 
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trate markets which had been traditionally supplied from Western 
Hemisphere sources or supplied by other fuels (mainly coal), Middle 
East posted prices were gradually reduced to compensate for freight 
cost from the Middle East to points of destinations in Europe and 
the United States. Since the American market was protected by 
prorating and quota systems, the differential between posted prices 
in these two markets continued to widen from an initial 62 cents per 
barrel in 1948 to $1.40 per barrel in 1961. This resulted from a series 
of price changes which had the effect of raising U.S. domestic prices 
(from $2.68 in 1948 to $3.28 in 1961) and lowering Middle East 
prices (from $2.08 in 1948 to $1.80 in 1961). 
As to the profitability of the Middle East oil concessions for the 
period 1948-1960, it was shown that the average per barrel revenue 
for the host governments was 67 cents compared with an average of 
$1.10 per barrel for the companies. Total government revenue for 
the same period amounted to $9.3 billion, while the net earnings of 
the companies amounted to $14.2 billion. Of the $14.2 billion, the 
companies reinvested $1.3 billion in fixed assets in the region and 
transferred $12.8 billion abroad. The ratio of net income to net fixed 
assets was computed to be 67 percent per year for the same period. rn 
II. OPEC'S FIRST DECADE 
The erosion of posted prices in the Middle East and Venezuela 
relative to U.S. prices, and the powerlessness of any single govern-
ment to arrest such erosion, made it necessary for oil producing 
countries to attempt to coordinate their efforts in their dealings with 
the majors. Although the nationalization of the Suez Canal and its 
shutdown in 1956 had demonstrated a potential for bargaining 
power on the part of oil producing countries, it was not until after 
the price cut of August 1960 that the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries was created. 17 
16. C. IssAwI & M. YEGANEH, THE EcoNoM1cs or MIDDLE EASTERN OtL 188-89 (1962). 
17. OPEC was founded by Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela. Qatar 
joined OPEC in 1961, Indonesia and Libya in 1962, Abu Dhabi in 1967, Algeria in 1969, 
Nigeria in 1971, and Ecuador in 1973. In addition to these 12 members, Gabon was admitted 
in 1974 as an associate member. 
It is interesting to note that some oilmen were worried that the 1959 price cut would push 
oil producing countries into an exporters' bloc. It is also worth mentioning that the creation 
of OPEC encountered the hostilities not only of the oil companies and Western governments, 
but also that of the Soviet Union . The latter suspected OPEC of being a front for the 
international oil companies. See The Birth of OPEC, and How It Grew: An Interview with 
Juan Pablo Perez Alfonso, Bus. WEEK, Jan. 13, 1975, at 78-79. 
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OPEC's First Conference stated in its first resolution that 
member countries could no longer remain indifferent to the attitude 
heretofore adopted by the oil companies in effecting price 
modifications, that they should endeavor by all means available to 
them to restore prices to the levels prevailing before the 1960 reduc-
tions, and stressed that, in the future, consultations with govern-
ments should be undertaken prior to any price modifications. It is 
important to note that the same resolution established the principle 
that member countries were to refrain from accepting any offer of 
beneficial treatment from the companies at the expense of each 
other's interest. 18 The enunciation of this principle was intended to 
mitigate against company attempts to divide OPEC by offering 
incentives to some and putting pressures on others. 19 Although 
OPEC reaffirmed its price resolution in subsequent conferences, it 
failed to evolve a collective bargaining position, and the attempt to 
restore prices to their pre-August 1960 level was abandoned in 1963. 
Instead, OPEC concentrated its effort on two other issues: (1) 
expensing of royalty; and (2) elimination of marketing expenses. 20 
When the companies unilaterally decided to reduce marketing ex-
penses from one percent of posted price to one-half cent a barrel, 
royalty expensing became the sole issue for long and difficult nego-
tiations. After a series of conferences and meetings to study com-
pany initial offers, modified offers, improved offers, last minute 
offers, and final offers over a period of more than two years, the 
royalty issue was settled in a rather anticlimactic manner. 21 This 
was so because OPEC's original position would have increased gov-
ernment revenue by 19 cents per barrel, while the final settlement 
resulted in a per barrel increase in revenue of 3.6 cents per barrel, 
18. For a more detailed analysis see Alnasrawi, Collective Bargaining Power in OPEC, 
7 .J. WORI.O TRADE L. 188 (1973). 
19. See The Birth of OPEC, and How It Grew, supra note 17. 
20. Royalty under the concession agreements was fixed at 12.5 percent of the posted price 
of crude and was credited by the companies against their income tax liability to the producing 
countries. Thus, under the 50-50 profit sharing system a company tax liability would be one-
half posted price minus production cost, less royalty. Royalty expensing, on the other hand, 
would change a company tax liability to one-half posted price minus cost, including royalty . 
Thus, the expensing of the royalty would increase company tax liability and government 
revenue by an amount equal to one-half of the royalty. See generally SHELL, THE OPEC 
ALLOWANCES (1968). 
21. For the articulation of OPEC arguments concerning royalties see OPEC, EXPLANA-
TORY MEMORANDA ON THE OPEC RESOLUTIONS 5-8, 11-14 (1962). As to the course of negotiations 
see OPEC and the Oil Companies, MEES SUPP., Aug. 28, 1964; OPEC, OPEC AND THE 
PRINCIPLE oF NEGOTIATION, 7-17 (1965); F. RouHANI, A HISTORY OF OPEC 217-43 (1971). 
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which rose to 5.4 cents per barrel in 1966 after allowing oil compa-
nies certain discounts off posted prices (8.5 percent in 1964 and 6.5 
percent in 1966). 
Once the royalty issue was settled and the price issue aban-
doned, member countries found themselves without a rallying point 
for the exercise of their collective bargaining power until 1971. In 
this interim, OPEC members were drawn in two different direc-
tions. The first was to attempt to agree on general principles of 
common interest with respect to oil policy. The second was to em-
bark on individualized policies intended to maximize benefits with-
out coordination with other countries. Thus, while Iran was success-
ful in raising output and Iraq was attempting to develop its oil 
resources, Libya, on the other hand, was concentrating its efforts on 
improving per barrel revenue, especially in the area of posted prices. 
Libya's price negotiations deserve a special treatment, since 
they provided a prelude to subsequent developments. Although 
Libya protested the low level of her posted prices as early as 1961, 
negotiations did not begin until 1967. The 1969 Libyan revolution 
drew particular attention to this dispute which was finally settled 
in September 1970. The Libyan price settlement was an important 
landmark in government-company relationships, in that it was the 
first successful attempt by a single government to raise posted 
prices. In the course of its negotiations with oil companies, the 
Libyan government seemed to have been helped by a number of 
important developments in the international oil economy. These 
developments included not only the continued closure of the Suez 
Canal, but also the closure of the Trans-Arabian Pipeline beginning 
in May 1970. Actual demand for crude oil supassed previous 
forecasts, causing a supply-demand imbalance to emerge. In the 
United States, signs of impending fuel shortage were emerging. 
Pollution-conscious countries were increasingly interested in the 
low-sulphur Libyan crude oil. The Libyan government for its part 
ordered, as of May 1970, a series of cutbacks, which by September 
of that year had the effect of reducing Libyan output from 3.6 mil-
lion BD (or MBD) to 2.8 MBD. Finally, the Libyan strategy in 
singling out Occidential Oil Company for negotiation (which, unlike 
the majors, had no alternative sources of supply) proved to be suc-
cessful. Thus, by September 4, 1970, an agreement was reached, 
which was followed by similar agreements with other operating com-
panies. The main provisions of these agreements were: (a) posted 
prices were increased by 30 cents per barrel and by a further two 
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cents per barrel each year over the following five years; (b) Libya's 
claim that oil had been underposted was settled by raising the in-
come tax rate from 50 percent to 54 percent; and (c) the adoption 
of a new gravity differential system. 22 
The Libyan settlement seemed to have set in motion a number 
of developments which proved to be irreversible. Coming on the 
heels of an already rising crude and product-price structure and at 
a time when freight rates were at their peak, the increase in com-
pany tax-paid cost was immediately passed on to the consumers. 
Moreover, as soon as the majors had agreed to raise Libyan posted 
prices, they announced an increase in Iraq and Saudi Arabia Medi-
terranean prices of 20 cents per barrel. This was followed in Novem-
ber by an increase in the income tax rate in Iran, Kuwait, and Saudi 
Arabia from 50 percent to 55 percent, accompanied by a nine cents 
per barrel increase in the price of heavy crude at Persian Gulf ter-
minals. These increases, like the previous ones, were passed on to 
the consumers. Before dealing with the impact of these develop-
ments on OPEC's behavior in the 1970's, it is necessary to review 
very briefly the interrelationship between the majors and their home 
governments. 
A. The Majors and Their Governments 
The majors' home governments (United States, United King-
dom, France, and the Netherlands) have all played significant roles 
in enabling their oil companies to acquire oil concessions, to pene-
trate markets, and to deal with oil producing countries. Depending 
on the situation and the historical context, these governments have 
at times cooperated with each other and at times opposed one an-
other. In both situations, the posture of the government was deter-
mined by its economic and foreign policy interests as conceived by 
policy makers. 23 The core of each government's policy, depending on 
the situation, was either to restrict exploitation to its corporate 
citizens, hence limiting access to foreign companies (as was the case 
with the Dutch and U.K. governments), or to back their corporate 
citizens in penetrations into areas under the control of other govern-
22. See MEES, Sept. 11 , 1970, at 1-3. 
23. This section relies heavily upon the following : Hearings on Multinational Corpora-
tions and United States Foreign Policy , supra note 12, pts. 3-7; MULTINATIONAL OIL CORPORA-
TIONS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 11; SuecOMM. ON MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS, 
SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 93D CONG . , 2D SESS. , THE INTERNATIONAL PETRO-
LEUM CARTEL, THE IRANIAN CONSORTIUM, AND U .S. NATIONAL SECURITY (Comm . Print 1974); THE 
INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM CARTEL, supra note 9; H. O'CONNOR, THE EMPIRE OF OIL (1962) . 
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ments (as was the policy of the U.S. and French governments). In 
either case, the governments involved employed the standard 
cliches of national security, national economic interests, open door 
policy, war alliances, discrimination, free trade, etc. The history of 
the struggle to control Iraq's oil through the ownership of IPC and 
the restrictive clauses of the arrangements between its owners (BP, 
Shell, Exxon, Mobil, and CFP) demonstrated how insincere the 
references to open door policy and free competition were. In the 
words of one of !PC's partners, "[T]he incorporation of IPC and the 
execution of the red-line agreement marked the beginning of a long 
term plan for the world control and distribution of oil in the Near 
East." 24 Evidence of the intimate interrelationships between the 
majors and the U.S. Government is abundant, thanks to Congres-
sional hearings and investigations, and is very relevant to the analy-
sis of the petrodollar situation. 
The U.S. Government backing of the American oil companies 
in the Middle East took an unusual form during World War II. Due 
to war conditions, Aramco was unable to produce enough oil to 
provide the funds needed by the Saudi Arabian government. Ar-
amco owners (Texaco and Socal) were successful in persuading the 
U.S. Government that it should provide the needed funds. Since the 
Lend-Lease assistance25 had been authorized only to democratic 
allies, the Roosevelt Administration solved the problem by asking 
the British to divert a portion of their $400 million to help King 
Saud stabilize his country. But since the British had begun to con-
solidate their position in Saudi Arabia, as well as presenting them-
selves as the real benefactors, both Aramco and the U.S. Govern-
ment were convinced that the concession was in danger. This led 
President Roosevelt in February 1943 to decide that the U.S. Gov-
ernment should provide the financial assistance directly to the 
Saudi government by a directive to the Lend-Lease Administrator 
which stated that "in order to enable you to arrange Lend-Lease aid 
to the government of Saudi Arabia, I hereby find that the defense 
24. From a memorandum prepared by the Compagnie Fran<;aise des Petroles in 1947, 
quoted in THE INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM CARTEL, supra note 9, at 112. 
25. See 15 U.S.C. § 713a-9. The Lend Lease Administration and the Board of Economic 
Warfare, referred to in the text of this statute, were consolidated with the Foreign Economic 
Administration on September 25, 1943, by Exec. Order No. 9380, 3 C.F.R. 42 (Supp. I, 1943). 
The Foreign Economic Administration was subsequently terminated, and the functions of the 
Board of Economic Warfare were transferred to the Department of State on September 27, 
1945, pursuant to Exec. Order No. 9630, 3 C.F.R. 119 (Supp. I, 1945), as amended on May 
27, 1946, by Exec. Order No. 9730, 3 C.F.R. 134 (Supp. I, 1946). 
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of Saudi Arabia is vital to the defense of the United States."26 
The Aramco merger of 1947 (when Exxon and Mobil joined 
Texaco and Socal) was not discouraged by the U.S. Government. 
Again, during the era of the Marshall Plan, when large amounts of 
aid went for petroleum, the Economic Cooperation Administration 
(ECA) was told by Secretary of State Dean Acheson in 1950 that: 
It is ECA policy in every petroleum transaction an American com-
pany must be involved. Not only are firms incorporated and residing 
in the U.S. eligible to receive ECA financing but ECA procurements 
for petroleum further contain the following provision: "deliveries 
from sources other than the United States and possessions will be 
eligible only if made by American owned and operated compa-
nies. " 27 
Given the fact that the five American majors were expanding their 
output in the Middle East, it is evident that the Marshall Plan's aid 
was used to enable American companies to penetrate the European 
markets. 
The State Department's effort did not confine itself to further-
ing the interests of the American majors throughout the world, but 
extended to frustrating the attempt by the Department of Justice 
in 1952 to criminally prosecute these majors for their violation of the 
antitrust laws of the United States. The Government's statement of 
claims against the companies said that it appeared that the uninter-
rupted extension and continuance of the basic cartel agreements 
had resulted in a world-wide pattern in which seven of the major oil 
companies: (1) controlled all major oil producing areas outside the 
United States; (2) controlled all foreign refining operations; (3) con-
trolled patent know-how and technology covering the refining pro-
cesses; (4) effectively divided world markets; (5) maintained non-
competitive world prices for oil and its products; and (6) controlled 
foreign pipelines and world tanker transportation facilities. 28 In the 
judgment of Secretary Acheson, however, "the institution of these 
proceedings against the company cartel would not help the achieve-
ment of the foreign policy aims of the United States in the Middle 
East and has the possibility of seriously impairing their attain-
ment."29 The Secretary went on to say that "the alleged conspiracy 
26. In return for this direct help, Aramco offered to set aside a separate petroleum reserve 
from which the U.S. Government could be supplied at preferentially low prices. See 
MULTINATIONAL OIL CORPORATIONS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 11, at 37-39. 
27. Id. at 83-84. 
28. Id. at 64; THE INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM CARTEL, THE IRANIAN CONSORTIUM AND U.S. 
NATIONAL SECURITY, supra note 23, at 6-16, 35-36. 
29. THE INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM CARTEL, THE IRANIAN CONSORTIUM AND U.S. NATIONAL 
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involves control of the major oil-producing areas . . This will, of 
course, strengthen the movement for renegotiation of the present 
concession agreements and may give encouragement to those groups 
urging nationalization. " 30 
It will be recalled that the Iranian government had nationalized 
BP in March 1951. The State Department was attempting to find a 
solution which would introduce the American majors into Iran and 
reintroduce the Iranian oil into the world market. But these compa-
nies could not be induced to enter Iran while they faced grand jury 
investigations and criminal proceedings. Although the National 
Security Council and the Departments of State, Defense, and Inte-
rior recommended that the grand jury investigation be termi-
nated, the Attorney General maintained as of January 1953 that the 
facts then available strongly suggested that the Sherman Act had 
been consciously and persistently violated by activities long since 
determined by the Supreme Court to be illegal. The Attorney Gen-
eral went on to say that the cartel should be prosecuted criminally 
if there were to be equal justice under the law.31 This conflict within 
the Executive branch was settled by President Truman, who or-
dered that the criminal investigation be replaced by civil litiga-
tion. 32 After the Eisenhower administration assumed office, the 
State Department took over from the Attorney General the problem 
of finding a solution to the Iranian problem. The State Department, 
in cooperation with the British government (following the overthrow 
of Dr. Mossadegh in August 1953, finally found the solution to the 
Iranian problem in the form of the Iranian Consortium, which was 
created in 1954. 33 
In 1958, when the monarchy in Iraq was overthrown, the U.S. 
Government gave strong consideration to military intervention to 
undo the coup. A decision was reached, however, that intervention 
in Iraq could not be justified as long as the revolutionary govern-
ment respected Western oil interests. This near intervention led one 
author to comment that "[g]unboat diplomacy was clearly in line 
SECURITY, supra note 23, at 5. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 33. 
32. Id. 
33. It is interesting to note that, on January 14, 1954, the National Security Council 
decided that "the security interests of the United States requires United States petroleum 
companies to participate in the international consortium." And pursuant to this decision, on 
January 20, 1954, the Attorney General rendered an opinion to the President that the pro-
posed consortium plan, when viewed in connection with the security requirements of the 
United States as determined by the National Security Council, would not in itself constitute 
an unreasonable restraint on trade. Id. at vii. 
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with the State Department's commitment to pipelines and prof-
its. " 34 
Finally, it should be mentioned that every one of the joint ven-
ture arrangements established by the majors in the Persian Gulf 
region was submitted in advance to the State Department for its 
approval. 35 The relationship between the U.S. foreign policy and the 
majors was assessed in the Report of the Subcommittee on Multina-
tional Corporations, Multinational Oil Corporations and U.S. For-
eign Policy. 36 In this Report it is noted that the system of oil alloca-
tion-between oil producing countries-was administered by the 
multinational oil corporations with the assistance of the U.S. Gov-
ernment. The system was premised on two basic assumptions: (1) 
that the companies were instruments of U.S. foreign policy; and (2) 
that the interests of the companies were basically identical with the 
U.S. national interests.37 The Report identifies the U.S. foreign pol-
icy objectives as: (1) that the United States provide a steady supply 
of oil to Europe and Japan at reasonable prices for post-World War 
II recovery and sustained economic growth; (2) that stable govern-
ments be maintained in pro-Western oil producing countries; and 
(3) that American-based firms be a dominant force in world oil 
trade. The Report goes on to state that these three U.S. foreign 
policy goals were largely attained during the 1950's and 1960's.38 
B. Overview 
1. The concession agreements which gave the seven majors 
the exclusive right over production and pricing policies reduced host 
governments to mere silent and passive tax collectors. In each pro-
ducing country the government was, by the nature of the joint own-
ership system, forced to face at least one of the large multinational 
oil corporations which in turn were backed by their home govern-
ments. 
2. The company cartel wielded tremendous economic and pol-
itical power due to its ability to manipulate production volumes 
through its allocation system from various sources and through a 
multitude of inter-company arrangements. 
3. The U.S. Government helped the five American majors to 
solidify their position and expand their markets. In order to stabilize 
34. R. ENGLER, THE POLITICS OF 01L: A STUDY OF THE PRIVATE POWER AND DEMOCRATIC 
DIRECTIONS 264 (1961). 
35. MULTINATIONAL OIL CORPORATIONS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 11, at 16. 
36. See generally id. 
37. Id. at 14. 
38. Id. at 2. 
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prices in the United States, state governments resorted to prorating, 
which was helped first by federal legislation and then by the import 
quota program. Furthermore, the U.S. Government looked at these 
majors as instruments of foreign policy. 
4. The structure of crude oil prices was such that, in order to 
stimulate the demand for their products, oil companies were able 
to gradually reduce Middle East oil prices, enabling them to prevent 
substitution and to capture the rising demand for energy in the last 
two decades. It is candidly admitted in the developed countries that 
the low cost of this form of energy made a significant contribution 
to their real economic growth in the postwar period. 
5. The relatively low level of the price of oil resulted in an 
increase in the often wasteful use of this depletable resource and in 
a rise in the rate of dependency of many economies on oil. Since oil 
was plentiful in the Middle East, this led policy makers to neglect 
non-oil, indigenous sources of energy and discouraged oil companies 
from seriously searching for oil outside the OPEC area, notwith-
standing Alaskan and North Sea explorations. 39 
6. Middle East oil proved highly profitable, giving oil compa-
nies an average annual rate of return of 67 percent for the period 
1948-60. Even as late as 1972, the ratio of earnings to net book value 
for the U.S. oil companies operating in the Middle East was close 
to 77 percent. Of the $2.2 billion earnings in that year, only $99 
million was reinvested in the host country, and the remaining $2.1 
billion was transferred to this country. 40 
7. OPEC in the 1960's played a marginal role in the interna-
tional oil industry. Its main objective was to improve member coun-
tries' per barrel revenue. Its success in this regard was very modest 
indeed. Its negotiations with the oil companies over the royalty 
expensing issue led it to examine the very principle of negotiation 
itself. 41 
8. The changing market conditions in 1970 and the Libyan 
government's successful negotiation of a raise in posted prices gave 
strong impetus to the Caracas resolutions and led to the successful 
Tehran collective negotiations in 1971. 
39. In this connection, Professor M.A. Adelman proposed in 1967 that Europe should 
close down its coal industry and turn its employees into pensioners and increase its oil 
stockpiles to meet future interruption. The net effect of his proposal was an annual saving of 
$3 billion. See M. ADELMAN, THE WORLD PETROLEUM MARKET 265-75 (1972). 
40. See 54 SURVEY OF CURRENT Bus., Aug. 1974, pt. II, table lOA, at 18-19. 
41. See generally OPEC, OPEC AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NEGOTIATIONS (1965). 
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9. Finally, it should be remembered that OPEC is composed 
of countries with substantially different political and economic sys-
tems. They have, however, two things in common. First, they are 
all underdeveloped countries, and second, they have the general 
objective of improving the economic returns from oil. 
III. OPEC'S SECOND DECADE-THE 1970'8 
A. The Caracas Conference 
It will be recalled that the immediate impetus for the oil pro-
ducing countries to form OPEC was the 1960 price reduction ef-
fected by the oil companies. In spite of several resolutions that these 
reductions should be restored, oil producing countries were unable 
to achieve this objective. The developments which took place in 
1970 forced oil producing countries to re-examine their position and 
to embark on the first serious experiment in collective bargaining 
with the oil companies. 
The December 1970 OPEC Conference in Caracas adopted a 
number of resolutions, the most important of which was Resolution 
120, 42 which set out to accomplish the following objectives: (1) the 
establishment of a minimum tax rate of 55 percent on company net 
income; (2) the elimination of existing disparities in posted or tax 
reference prices in member countries; (3) a uniform increase in 
prices to reflect the general improvement in the conditions of the 
international petroleum market; ( 4) the adoption of a new system 
for the adjustment of gravity differential; and (5) the elimination 
of OPEC allowances. 
To attain these objectives, the Conference selected a negotiat-
ing committee and set a specific timetable for the negotiations. It 
would be redundant to detail the negotiations since they were abun-
dantly documented elsewhere. 43 It should be noted that while these 
negotiations represented OPEC's first collective attempt to raise 
prices, the companies-majors and non-majors-agreed upon a 
joint strategy which was encouraged by the State Department and 
facilitated by the Department of Justice's issuance of a Business 
Review letter providing the companies with anti-trust clearance. 
42. For the text of Resolution 120 see MEES SUPP., Jan. 1, 1971. 
43. For a detailed weekly review of the negotiations see the January and February 1971 
issues of Middle East Economic Survey and Petroleum Intelligence Weekly . See also F. 
ROUHANI, supra note 21, at 9-28; MULTINATIONAL OIL CORPORATIONS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, 
supra note 11, at 126-34. 
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The Tehran Agreement44 was finally concluded on February 14, 
1971, after an extraordinary OPEC Conference which threatened to 
legislate the Caracas objectives and to place embargos on those 
companies which refused to comply with the new legislation. The 
agreement which confirmed the then existing concession agree-
ments was to last for five years. The financial terms of the agree-
ment provided: (1) a stabilization of the income tax rate at a rate 
of 55 percent; (2) a uniform increase of 33 cents per barrel in the 
posted prices of crude oils exported from Persian Gulf terminals; (3) 
another uniform increase of two cents per barrel for freight dispar-
ity; (4) further uniform increases of five cents per barrel effective 
June 1, 1971, and January 1, 1973, 1974, and 1975; (5) an increase 
of 2.5 percent in posted prices effective June 1, 1971, and January 
1, 1973, 1974, and 1975; (6) elimination of existing OPEC allow-
ances; and (7) adoption of a new system for the adjustment of grav-
ity differentials. In terms of government per barrel revenue, these 
terms add up to a gain of 30 cents per barrel in 1971, rising by 
another 20 cents per barrel in 1975. 
It should be noted that the Tehran Agreement which dealt with 
exports from the Persian Gulf was followed by agreements with 
Libya, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia to cover these countries' exports from 
the Mediterranean seaports. Another agreement was concluded 
with Nigeria. These agreements recognized the locational advantage 
of these countries over the Persian Gulf countries, but otherwise 
embodied the same provisions as those of the Tehran Agreement; 
hence, the use of the term "Tehran and related agreements" in 
subsequent sections. 
It should also be noted that both Algeria and Venezuela have 
legislated price increases, and Indonesia has followed its own path 
outside the framework of the Tehran Agreement in raising prices. 45 
B. OPEC and the International Monetary Crisis 
It is interesting to note, in retrospect, that, while the Tehran 
and related agreements were being negotiated, a crisis destined to 
put an end to the international monetary system as it had operated 
since the end of World War II was in the making. The crisis culmi-
nated in forcing the U.S. Government to suspend, on August 15, 
1971, convertibility of the dollar into gold and other reserve assets, 
44. For the text of the Tehran Agreement see OPEC, SELECTED DOCUMENTS or THE INTER-
NATIONAL PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 391-94 (1971). 
45. 1971 OPEC ANNUAL REVIEW AND RECORD 9-10. 
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hence allowing its value in terms of other currencies to float. Since 
the currencies of major European countries appreciated relative to 
the dollar-the currency in which posted prices are expressed and 
revenues computed-OPEC sought an upward adjustment in these 
prices to offset the decline in the value of the dollar. OPEC's initial 
position was that the Smithsonian Agreement46 of December 1971 
had resulted in an effective devaluation of the dollar of 12 percent 
vis-a-vis other major currencies. The companies' position, on the 
other hand, was that, according to the Smithsonian Agreement, the 
United States had agreed to devalue the dollar in terms of gold by 
only 8.27 percent. An agreement between the two groups was finally 
reached in Geneva in January 1972, whereby posted prices were 
raised by 8.49 percent (raising government take by 11 cents per 
barrel), and further adjustments, upward and downward, were to be 
undertaken quarterly according to an agreed-upon currency index. 47 
C. Participation 
Concurrent with these negotiations on the issue of the effects 
of dollar devaluation, OPEC decided to embark on another and 
more important set of negotiations concerning the purchase by 
member countries of equity interest in the operating companies, 
that is, participation. The participation negotiations were given 
impetus when Iraq decided to nationalize the IPC concession in 
June 1972. By the end of that year an agreement was reached ac-
cording to which governments were to acquire a 25 percent interest 
in 1973, which was to rise to 30 percent in 1978, and then gradually 
to 51 percent in 1982. For their acquisition, governments were to pay 
according to a formula known as "updated net book value"-which 
is basically net book value adjusted for inflation. 48 The bulk of the 
46. The ministers and central bank governors of the Group of 10 industrialized nations 
met at the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, D.C., on December 17-18, 1971, to agree 
upon a new pattern of currency exchange rates. Among the terms of this Smithsonian Agree-
ment were: (1) that the U.S. dollar would be devalued in terms of gold by 8.27 percent; (2) 
that several other currencies, led by the Japanese yen, would be revalued upward; and (3) 
that the U.S. 10 percent import surcharge would be removed the week following the Agree-
ment. The Group of 10 communique left each country to announce its new exchange rate. 
For the text of the Group of 10 communique see N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1971, at 56, col. 3. 
47. The January 20, 1972, Geneva Agreement which raised government take by 11 cents 
per barrel was renegotiated in June 1973 to reflect the 10 percent dollar devaluation of 
February 1973 in terms of gold (from $38 to $42.22 an ounce). The 1973 Agreement provided 
for an increase in posted prices of 11.9 percent over the January 1973 level , yielding an 
increase of nine cents per barrel in government take . See MEES, Feb . 16, 1973, at 1-2; MEES 
SUPP., June 1, 1973. 
48. It is interesting to note that according to this formula the cost of the 25 percent 
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oil produced was to revert to the companies according to a buyback 
pricing formula. This provision was of utmost importance to the 
companies since "for Aramco partners, the primary negotiating 
objective of the participation negotiations was insuring their contin-
ued exclusive access to the Saudi participation oil. " 49 The net effect 
of the participation arrangements was to increase government take 
by 11 cents per barrel. 50 Subsequent developments dramatically 
changed the participation arrangements, as OPEC governments 
raised their participation first to 40 percent, then to 60 percent, and 
recently Kuwait raised its share to 100 percent.51 
D. Oil Producing Countries and World Economy 
In 1973, the OPEC countries had a combined population of 300 
million people and a combined GNP of $86 billion, or $316 per 
capita GNP. In the same year, the GNP per capita for all the less 
developed countries was $356. To put things in a different perspec-
tive, Canada's GNP in 1973 was $119 billion with a per capita GNP 
of $5,336. In 1974, OPEC's GNP rose to $148 billion (or 10.6 percent 
of the U.S. GNP), and the per capita increased to $537.52 
The impact of OPEC's behavior should be considered within 
the existing structure of the international economy. It should be 
noted that of the nonsocialist world GNP, the developed countries 
receive 82 percent, while the developing countries (including OPEC) 
receive the remaining 18 percent. 53 It should also be noted that the 
bulk of the international trade (over 70 percent) is conducted by the 
developed countries. Given these two facts, it seems only logical 
that the international monetary system which was put together by 
the developed countries had to reflect these countries' economic, 
fiscal, monetary, and trade policies with all the conflicts, tensions, 
and compromises which these countries had to deal with over the 
last 30 years. And since the developing countries are dependent on 
the developed economies for their exports, imports, and financial 
flows, it follows that the changes in the developed countries' 
acquisition was computed to be $500 million for Aramco, $150 million for Kuwait, $68 million 
for Iraq (BPC), $71 million for Qatar, and $162 million for Abu Dhabi. See MEES, SUPP., 
Dec. 22, 1972. 
49. MULTINATIONAL OIL CORPORATIONS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 11, at 136. 
50. MEES, Dec. 29, 1972, at 1. 
51. See generally MEES, Feb. 1, 1974; MEES, June 14, 1974; MEES, Mar . 7, 1975. 
52. See IMF SURVEY, Feb. 3, 1974, at 38. 
53. See DEP'T or STATE, THE PLANETARY PRODUCT IN 1973 (Special Report No. 11), table 
5. 
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domestic economies, as well as in trade between them (recession, 
inflation, real economic growth, and exchange rate fluctuations), 
are transmitted to the developing countries due to their economic 
dependency. The impact on OPEC of this asymmetry in the distri-
bution of economic power is very clear. The ratio of oil exports to 
total exports ranged in 1970 from 39 percent for Indonesia to 66 
percent for Algeria, 58 percent for Nigeria, 89 percent for Iran, and 
well over 90 percent for Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, and Saudi Arabia. The 
per barrel revenue in the Middle East, which was 86 cents in 1957, 
declined to 76 cents in 1961, but increased by 1970 to its 1957 level 
of 86 cents. During the same period prices of exported goods in-
creased by 22 percent in the United States, 14 percent in Canada, 
17 percent in the United Kingdom, 14 percent in France, 21 percent 
in Germany, seven percent in Italy, and four percent in Japan.54 
Thus while these countries' oil import prices declined, OPEC prices 
of imported goods from these countries increased substantially. The 
magnitude of the decline can be seen from an index compiled by 
Petroleum Intelligence Weekly. According to this index-which 
took into consideration changes in currency values in relation to the 
U.S. dollar-the landed price of oil was much lower in Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands, and Japan in 1970 than it was in 1957. And 
in terms of dollars, the selling price of Middle East oil underwent a 
long and sustained decline from 1957 to 1970, a decline which 
amounted to 32 percent. Even with subsequent tax price increases 
(due to the Tehran and Geneva Conferences), the 1972 Middle East 
oil prices were as much as 20 percent below the 1957 level in terms 
of most consuming countries' own currency outlays. 55 Given these 
relationships and the very high rate of return on investment in the 
oil industry, one is compelled to conclude that there has been a 
sustained and massive transfer of wealth from the oil producing 
countries to the developed countries, thanks to the structure of the 
international oil industry and the international economy. The net 
effect of these institutional arrangements was to force these coun-
tries to pay higher prices for goods whose production was greatly 
helped by the constantly declining price of oil. 
It should be noted that oil producers recognized as early as 1962 
the link between their import prices and crude oil prices as shown 
in OPEC's Resolution 32 which stated that "Member Countries 
54. 1974 ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 93. 
55. PIW, Mar. 27, 1972, at 5-6. 
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shall jointly formulate a rational price structure to guide their long 
term price policy . . . . An important element of the price structure 
to be devised will be the linking of crude oil prices to an index of 
prices of goods which the Member Countries import." 56 OPEC, how-
ever, failed to implement this resolution, as evidenced by the fact 
that seven years and 71 resolutions later a similar resolution was 
passed. Thus, Resolution 103, 57 which was adopted in 1969, called 
for the undertaking of a study with a view towards linking posted 
and tax reference prices to those of manufactured goods of major 
industrialized countries. By that time, of course, it was evident that 
inflation in the industrial countries was on its upward course. Al-
though it was not until 1971, when the Tehran agreement was con-
cluded, that world price inflation was recognized as a factor in reve-
nue determination, this recognition was rather minor. 
Not only did developing countries suffer from the consequences 
of inflation, but they also suffered from the consequences of an 
unstable international monetary system. The stresses, strains, 
crises, and upheavals which engulfed the system throughout its life 
are in part a reflection of changes in the relative economic positions 
of the developed countries and the operations of the giant multina-
tional corporations which dominate the world economic scene. Here 
again, while the system was attempting to reconcile conflicting in-
terests, the countries of the Third World found that their currencies 
fluctuated in value, their reserves dwindled, their access to capital 
markets was hindered, and their development plans were always 
threatened.58 
E. Oil Supply/Demand Imbalance 
It will be recalled that in order to protect the U.S. oil industry 
from the disruptive effects of competition, a system of prorating was 
instituted to regulate output and stabilize prices. Further, in order 
to insulate the industry from the influx of cheap foreign oil, an 
import quota system was adopted. As the United States continued 
to increase its imports, Texas found itself producing 28 percent of 
capacity in 1964. As demand for oil continued to rise, the idle capac-
56. For the text of Resolution 32 see OPEC, EXPLANATORY MEMORANDA ON THE OPEC 
RESOLUTIONS 3-4 (1962) . 
57. For the text of Resolution 103 see MEES, Aug. 15, 1969. 
58. These points were discussed in more detail in a paper entitled: Alnasrawi, The 
International Monetary System and the Oil Producing Countries, presented at the Baghdad 
Second International Seminar, Baghdad, Nov. 1-4, 1974. 
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ity began to disappear, and by 1972 Texas was producing at 100 
percent capacity. In the meantime, the measures which the devel-
oped countries adopted in 1971 and 1972 to stimulate economic 
activity in 1972-73 throughout the industrial world increased devel-
oped countries' demand for oil at a time when certain producing 
countries, especially Kuwait and Libya, had adopted conservation 
measures to limit the growth of oil output. The shift from natural 
gas to oil in the United States added another factor to the increased 
demand for oil and its products. The world was unprepared for the 
massive buying of oil by the United States for several reasons. First, 
excess capacity in the Middle East was no longer available. Sec-
ond, the refining capacity in this country, because of the prorating, 
failed to expand sufficiently to meet domestic needs. Third, refining 
capacity overseas was predicated on the limited access to the U.S. 
market because of the import control program. Thus its removal, in 
1973, found the United States competing for oil, a development that 
had not been foreseen. Thus, while Western Europe increased its 
imports by 18 percent between 1970 and 1973 and Japan by 35 
percent, the United States increased its imports by 81 percent (from 
3.4 MBD to 6.2 MBD, or by 2.8 MBD, of which over one-half or 1.5 
MBD occurred in 1973 over 1972). 59 This increase in the demand for 
oil had the obvious effect of exerting a sharp upward pressure on oil 
and product prices. 60 This in tum resulted in a sharp rise in the 
majors' profits, ranging from 41 percent for Mobil to 82 percent for 
Gulf in the second quarter of 1973 over the second quarter of 1972 
(the average for the five American majors was 51.8 percent). 61 In 
August 1973, Venezuela raised the tax export values, and in the 
same month it was revealed that the Nigerian government was able 
to sell its royalty oil at a record price of $5 per barrel, or 71 cents 
above postings. 62 The significance of the Nigerian sale was not in the 
predictable repercussions that it was bound to create, but rather in 
signaling the end of the era when posted prices had traditionally 
remained above actual sale prices. In reflecting the underlying mar-
59. Computed from import data in 1973 BP STATISTICAL REVIEW OF THE WORLD OIL 
INDUSTRY 21. 
60. OPEC estimated that product prices charged by oil companies in consumer markets 
rose from an average of $21 per metric ton in 1970 to $52 per ton in 1973, whereas the average 
government take in the OPEC countries increased from $7 to $13 per ton during the same 
period. See MEES, Sept. 21, 1973, at 2, 3. 
61. PIW, Aug. 6, 1973, at 5. 
62 . PIW, Aug. 20, 1973, at 5. It is interesting to note that government take at the time 
was about $2.71 per barrel. 
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ket conditions, the Nigerian sale also reflected the fact that the 
traditional split in profits between governments and companies had 
been altered in favor of the companies. 63 
In addition to the changes in market prices, OPEC was con-
cerned about the sharp erosion in oil revenue purchasing power 
which resulted from the spiraling worldwide inflation. Inflation was 
rising at a much higher rate than the 2.5 percent incorporated in the 
Tehran Agreement of 1971. Given these two forces, all member 
countries agreed that posted prices and oil revenue should be ad-
justed to reflect the changing market conditions. As was to be ex-
pected, there were differences of opinion as to the approach to be 
adopted. Some members were advocating as early as March 1973 
that the Tehran Agreement should be scrapped and that OPEC 
should unilaterally set prices-a practice which Venezuela, Algeria, 
and Indonesia had been using. Other members felt that the Agree-
ment should be preserved, but that OPEC should negotiate a lim-
ited revision to compensate for inflation without changing the basic 
structure of the Agreement. By September a compromise was 
reached whereby it was decided that an extensive, rather than a 
limited, revision of the Tehran Agreement should be undertaken 
through negotiations with the companies. It was also decided that 
if no agreement could be reached, then the OPEC governments 
would set new prices. 64 
It is significant to note in this connection that, aside from the 
fiscal objective, the higher prices were looked at by long range plan-
ners in the OPEC countries as a means to relieve the pressure on 
some of them to produce much more oil than they actually needed 
to meet their economic needs. Higher prices were looked at as a 
means: (1) to promote more efficient use of energy; and (2) to stimu-
late the development of alternative sources of energy which would 
be essential regardless of what happened to conventional fuels. 65 
With these conditions in mind, on October 8, 1973, OPEC ap-
63. This is illustrated by the evolution of tax-paid cost (cost of production plus payment 
to producing government) and actual selling prices. Arabian light tax-paid cost increased by 
15 cents per barrel (from $1.55 to $1.70) between January 1972 and April 1973, while actual 
selling price by the companies increased by 46 cents (from $1.84 to $2.30). See PIW, June 4, 
1973, at 4; MEES, Dec. 28, 1973, at 3. It is estimated that the national profit on realized prices 
between governments and companies may have changed from 80-20 in the governments' favor 
at the time of the Tehran Agreement to approximately 64-36 by September 1973. See MEES, 
Sept. 21, 1973, at 2. 
64. MEES, Sept. 7, 1973, at 1-2. 
65. MEES, Sept. 21, 1973, at 4. 
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pointed a ministerial committee to negotiate the rev1s1on of the 
terms of the Tehran Agreement with the oil companies. 66 
F. The 1973 Price Revolution 
Before the October 1973 price negotiations, OPEC experts had 
calculated that between 1970-71 and September 1973, oil compa-
nies' "netback" (product prices minus all costs and taxes) had 
increased by $2.20 per barrel. It was therefore speculated that 
OPEC would ask for a rise in posted prices of similar amount or an 
increase of $2 per barrel over the $3.11 per barrel of October 1. 
OPEC also felt that the companies should not raise their prices to 
the consumers since they had already done so. 67 
When the negotiations started, OPEC's initial position was to 
ask for a price increase of $3 per barrel, while the companies' posi-
tion was to offer 45 cents. Although the industry was willing to 
improve its offer, the position of their home governments was that 
the companies should not do so. 68 In light of the subsequent events 
this decision by the governments of the developed countries turned 
out to be a major miscalculation. The negotiations were suspended 
on October 11, and five days later the OPEC governments unilater-
ally raised posted prices by $2 per barrel (70 percent above October 
1 postings or 17 percent above market prices), 69 thereby raising gov-
ernment take by $1.28 per barrel.70 In the meantime, the October 
Arab-Israeli war was going on. On October 12, the four Aramco 
owners warned President Nixon that an Arab production cutback 
was imminent if the United States increased its support for Israel. 
On October 15, the State Department announced that the United 
States had begun an airlift to resupply Israel with aircraft and 
66. Resolution 160, dated September 16, 1973. In 1968, OPEC adopted under Resolution 
90 a Declaratory Statement of Petroleum Policy in Member Countries. This Policy Statement 
states that posted or tax reference prices shall move in such a manner as to prevent any 
deterioration in their relationship to the prices of manufactured goods traded internationally. 
The Statement embodied another principle, which stated that the operator shall not have 
the right to obtain excessively high net earnings after taxes, and that the financial provision 
of contracts which actually results in such excessively high net earnings shall be open to 
renegotiations. Excessively high net earnings were defined to mean net profits after taxes 
which are significantly in excess, during any twelve-month period, of the level of net earnings, 
the reasonable expectation of which would have been sufficient to induce the operator to take 
the entrepreneurial risks necessary. 
67. MEES, Sept. 21, 1973, at 3. 
68. MULTINATIONAL OIL CORPORATIONS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 11, at 148-
50. 
69. See OPEC Press Release, Oct. 16, 1973, at i-ii. 
70. Int'l Oil Companies Press Release, Oct. 17, 1973, at ii. 
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equipment to replace losses. On October 17, the Arab producers 
decided on an oil cutback accompanied by embargoes on exports to 
the United States and the Netherlands. By November, the cutbacks 
amounted to 20 percent of the September output. The cutbacks and 
the embargo accentuated an already existing shortage. Hence, while 
oil in the Persian Gulf was posted at $5 per barrel, the National 
Iranian Oil Company was able to sell its oil at prices of up to $17 
per barrel, while the Nigerian government sold its oil at $20 per 
barrel.71 This development encouraged Iran to lead the drive, at the 
next OPEC meeting in December, to raise posted prices by 130 
percent to $11.65 per barrel, giving governments a per barrel reve-
nue of $7 .00.72 The Arab states felt that this latest price increase had 
gone too far and that it tended to dilute the political impact of the 
cutbacks and the embargo.73 
These increases led to certain significant economic and finan-
cial consequences for both oil producers and consumers. Before 
dealing with the ramifications of the October/December 1973 price 
explosions for the world economy, it would be useful to briefly re-
view the 197 4 developments in the areas of prices, government take, 
royalty and tax rates, and company tax paid cost. 
The situation as of January 1, 1974, was as follows: the govern-
ment take on the Saudi Arabian marker crude oil was set at $7 per 
barrel. Given a royalty rate of 12.5 percent and an income tax rate 
of 55 percent, the posted price for the marker crude was set at $11.65 
per barrel. The cost to the companies was the government take plus 
production cost, or a total of $7 .10 per barrel (assuming production 
cost of 10 cents per barrel). Again, effective January 1, 1974, the 
government of Kuwait reached a new participation agreement with 
the oil companies which raised its participation share to 60 percent. 
According to this new arrangement, the tax-paid cost on the compa-
nies' 40 percent share of the oil (equity oil) was the $7.10 per barrel 
mentioned earlier, but the oil companies were to pay 94 percent of 
the posted price ($10.96 per barrel buy-back price) on the oil they 
extracted in excess of their 40 percent equity share. The buy-back 
price was the price to be charged by Kuwait to other buyers (that 
is, independents). The Kuwaiti model, which was followed by the 
other Persian Gulf producing countries, created an interesting 
anomaly in the market. It enabled the majors to undercut govern-
71. MEES, Dec. 28, 1973, at 1. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 2. 
29
Alnasrawi: Petrodollar overview
Published by SURFACE, 1975
396 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 3:369 
ment sales to third parties, since the cost of the equity oil to the 
majors was about $4 per barrel less than the price at which govern-
ments were willing to sell their participation crude. This situation 
was clearly untenable. In order to correct it, a series of actions was 
undertaken to eliminate the gap between the prices of participation 
and equity oil. These actions culminated in an increase of the roy-
alty rate from 12.5 percent to 20 percent and the income tax rate 
from 55 percent to 85 percent, accompanied by a reduction of 40 
cents per barrel in posted prices, a reduction in the buy-back price 
to 93 percent, and a freeze in prices for the first nine months of 1975. 
Thus, by January 1, 1975, the relationships were as follows: posted 
price $11.25, buy-back price $10.45, average government take 
$10.12, and average tax-paid cost $10.25, thus giving the majors an 
advantage of 21 cents per barrel over competitors. It should be noted 
in this connection that, as late as November 1974, the majors con-
tinued to receive 95 percent of the oil produced in most of the Per-
sian Gulf states. 
G. Consequences of the Price Explosions 
The steep and sudden increase in the prices had important 
consequences for all the countries of the world. The obvious one was 
the dramatic increase in the oil revenue of OPEC countries. These 
revenues, according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD), increased from $23 billion in 1973 to $90 
billion in 1974, raising the import cost of consuming countries by $67 
billion.74 The increase in oil import cost for the OECD countries was 
estimated to be $59 billion (United States, $15 billion; Japan, $12 
billion; and Europe, $32 billion). 75 The balance, $8 billion, repre-
sents the increase in oil import cost for the Third World countries. 
Looking at the 197 4 oil cost increases from a different angle, we find 
that for the industrial countries the cost increment represented less 
than two percent of their combined GNP. For the developing coun-
tries, the ratio was 1.2 percent. Leaving aside the Third World coun-
tries for a moment, estimates for OECD countries indicated that for 
1974 oil imports from OPEC might rise by more than $55 billion, 
and exports to OPEC were expected to rise by $12 billion in the 
same year. 76 The OECD trade deficit with OPEC had already 
74. See IMF SURVEY, Feb. 3, 1975, at 38. 
75. OECD, ECONOMIC OUTLOOK, Dec. 1974, at 61. 
76. Id. at 53. 
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reached its peak in the second half of 1974 and should have im-
proved thereafter. 77 
The improvement in the OECD trade deficit is expected to 
result from several factors: a further rise in their export prices; the 
leveling off of oil prices; and the already visible decline in demand 
for oil as a result of conservation, recession, and higher oil prices. 
Within OECD, the impact of the higher prices relative to GNP 
varied from 1.1 percent for the United States, to 2.4 percent for the 
Common Market countries, to three percent for Japan. 78 The impli-
cation of these differences is that the United States improved its 
competitive position vis-a-vis its trading partners. It should be 
mentioned in this connection that, in addition to the much lower 
dependency of the United States on foreign oil imports, the United 
States enjoyed a net investment income from abroad of about $9.7 
billion in 197 4, $7 billion of which resulted from petroleum related 
transactions.79 Although the rise in oil prices contributed in varying 
degrees to current account difficulties of importing countries, it 
should be remembered that countries like the United States, the 
United Kingdom, France, and Italy were experiencing these prob-
lems long before the 1973-74 price increases. The U.S. current ac-
count deficit, for example, was as high as $9.8 billion in 1972; in 1974 
it was about $5 billion, while it showed a surplus of $0.5 billion in 
1973. By contrast, Germany's current balance registered a surplus 
of about $9 billion in 197 4. The point at issue here is that the impact 
of the rise in oil prices cannot be singled out, but rather should be 
dealt with within the context of a country's total foreign 
transactions. This statement is not intended, however, to deny the 
existence of another issue, that is, the role of the so-called petrodol-
lar, a subject which will be discussed in the following section. 
Another consequence of the price explosion was the contribu-
tion it made to the problem of inflation. Estimates of the direct and 
indirect contribution of the rise in energy costs vary from two per-
cent to 3.5 percent in the United States. According to the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, the consumer price index increased by 12.2 per-
cent in the fourth quarter of 1974 over the comparable period in 
77. Id. 
78. Ireland and Denmark were excluded from the Common Market Countries for lack of 
data on their oil imports. The U.S. ratio was related to the 1974 GNP, while those of Japan 
and the Common Market were related to the 1973 GNP. The ratios would have been lower 
had the 1974 GNP data been available at the time of writing. 
79. See FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. Louis REv., Dec. 1974, at 12. 
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1973. Directly purchased energy contributed 11.4 percent, food 24.6 
percent, and all other items 64 percent to the rise in the index.so For 
the OECD countries as a whole, it was estimated that the price 
increases resulting from higher petroleum prices may have ac-
counted for about one-fourth of the overall increase in the consumer 
price index while food prices contributed anywhere between one-
fourth and one-half to the index.s1 It is a well-known fact that infla-
tion had become a serious problem in the industrial countries as 
early as 1965, but that its rate had greatly accelerated since 1970. 
Thus, between 1970 and the third quarter of 1973-before the Octo-
ber price rise-the consumer price index had increased by nearly 16 
percent in the United States, 27 percent in Japan, 19 percent in 
Germany, 24 percent in Italy, and 28 percent in the United King-
dom.s2 
Finally, oil prices and OPEC were blamed not only for the 
inflation problem, but also for the recession in major industrial 
countries. A distinguished economist recently said that if you turn 
the present recession (in the United States) upside down and read 
on the bottom it will say "Made in Washington."s3 The recession, 
in other words, has been by design. The stage for recession and 
inflation in the industrial countries during 197 4 was largely set in 
1970-71. Beginning in late 1969, there was a widespread economic 
slowdown which called for the usual expansionary monetary and 
fiscal policies. The stimulative measures which industrial countries 
adopted in 1971 and 1972 resulted in an unusual degree of simulta-
neous sharp expansion in economic activity, a development which 
contributed to the acceleration of worldw_ide inflation. When it was 
realized generally that the 1973 rates of economic growth were un-
sustainable, a shift in economic policy to curb inflation was deemed 
necessary. This shift, together with supply constraints, led to a 
sharp decline in the rate of economic growth in the industrial coun-
tries. This decline in real output, which was expected to extend into 
the first half of 1974, failed to curb inflation. Prices continued on 
their upward trend, reflecting the entrenchment of monopoly forces 
in these economies. Thus, the 1973 stagnation, which turned into a 
recession in 1974, coupled with the continued inflation, posed a 
80. 1975 ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 48. 
81. lnfiation and Stagnation in Major Foreign Industrial Countries, 60 FED. RESERVE 
BULL. 693-94 (1974). 
82. 1975 ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 359. 
83. P . Samuelson, quoted in N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1975, at 53, col. 3. 
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most serious challenge to economists, governments, and policy mak-
ers in the industrial countries. The question was how to reconcile 
the conflict between the economic policy objectives of the low rate 
of unemployment and price stability? The failure of economic policy 
makers to attain an answer was candidly admitted by Professor 
Samuelson when he said that no mixed economy-not the United 
States or United Kingdom, Sweden or Switzerland, Germany or 
Japan, France or Italy-knows how to sustain full employment with 
price stability.84 
H. The Plight of Developing Countries 
I would like to preface my remarks on this subject by referring 
to an article I wrote in 1972. In it, I said the time has come for oil 
producing countries to pay attention to the economic development 
problems of the Third World countries. It is true, of course, that oil 
producing countries are underdeveloped themselves. It is equally 
true, however, that part of their revenue is derived from countries 
some of which are even less developed and certainly poorer than 
they are. Thus, the recycling of part of their excess reserves into the 
economies of these poor countries, rather than into the banking 
system of the rich countries, needs no economic, political, or moral 
justification. Let us not forget that the existing system of interna-
tional trade and finance contains within it a built-in bias. It is that 
the distribution of the benefits is tilted in favor of the few rich 
countries to the detriment of the many poor countries. It is only 
appropriate, therefore, that one of OPEC's roles should be to help 
mitigate some of the adverse effects of this bias.85 
A recent study by OECD86 revealed not only my ignorance, but 
also the fact that certain OPEC countries (mainly Arab) were pro-
viding economic assistance to other developing countries (primarily 
Arab, but also African, countries). The flow of official economic aid 
from these countries, though modest in absolute terms (between 
$480 million and $530 million during 1970-73), was not insignificant, 
relative to GNP. Thus, net aid disbursements (exclusive of military 
asistance) provided by Libya, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia amounted 
to 3.6 percent and 2.7 percent of their GNP in 1972 and 1973 respec-
tively.87 These ratios are well above the one-third of one percent of 
84. Samuelson, Coping with Stagfiation, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 1974, at 69. 
85. Alnasrawi, supra note 18, at 207. 
86. See IMF SURVEY, Nov. 18, 1974, at 357, 360-62. 
87. Id. 
33
Alnasrawi: Petrodollar overview
Published by SURFACE, 1975
400 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 3:369 
economic assistance provided by the industrial countries to develop-
ing countries.ss Having noted this, it should be readily acknowl-
edged that the 1973-7 4 price increases added to the already deterio-
rating economic conditions in which the Third World countries 
found themselves. First, it should be stressed that, since 1972, ex-
penditures by developing countries (including OPEC countries) for 
food grains, a good part of which is imported from the developed 
countries, increased significantly (from $2.8 billion in 1972 to $9 
billion in 197 4). It should be mentioned in this respect that food 
price rises have contributed significantly to this increase. The ex-
port price of U.S. wheat, for example, increased by 219 percent from 
its 1971-72 level to September 1973.s9 Another factor is the state of 
economic dependency of developing countries on the economies of 
the developed countries. It is a well known fact that developing 
countries' export earnings fluctuate with the cyclical fluctuations of 
the economic activity in the industrial countries. The 1973 economic 
slowdown, for instance, resulted in a sharp reduction from the per-
centage of goods imported by the OECD countries from the develop-
ing nations (from 12 percent in 1972 to 5.2 percent in 1973).90 A third 
factor in the plight of developing countries was the high rate of 
inflation in the OECD countries, which has been transmitted to 
international trade in the form of higher import prices, exacerbated 
by the fact that barriers against manufactured goods from the Third 
World countries are greater than those against manufactured goods 
from industrial countries. 91 Another factor in the plight was the rise 
during 1973 in the prices of fertilizers which became an essential 
ingredient for some of the "miracle crops" of the "green revolution," 
and the physical scarcity of fertilizers available to developing coun-
tries. 92 Last, but not least, was the size of official development aid 
(ODA) flowing to the developing countries. Although ODA in-
creased by 44 percent between 1967 and 1973 (from $6.5 billion to 
$9.4 billion), its ratio to industrial countries' GNP actually declined 
from four-tenths to three-tenths of one percent. 93 Knowing how im-
portant inflation was, it is safe to say that in real terms the increase 
88. 1974 WORLD BANK ANN. REP. 8. 
89. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE WORLD ECONOMY, supra note 
14, at 53. 
90. Id. at 51. 
91. Id. at 58. 
92. Id. at 53-54. It has been estimated that this year's fertilizer shortage will cost India 
10 million tons of grain-a year's supply for 50 million people. Id. at 54. 
93. 1974 WORLD BANK ANN. REP. 82. 
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in the aid was much smaller than the data might suggest. 
It is upon these economic conditions (decline in exports, rise in 
imports, transmitted inflation, deteriorating terms of trade, and 
relative decline in economic aid) that the rise in oil prices was im-
posed. However, much of the comment-official and profes-
sional-upon the oil price increases since October 1973 seems to 
have missed-deliberately or unintentionally-the central point: oil 
prices cannot and should not be blamed for the totality or the com-
plexity of the economic problems of the Third World countries. 
Personally, I am of the opinion that OPEC should have followed a 
policy of price discrimination in favor of developing countries. Since 
such a policy was not adopted, OPEC resorted to the policy of 
offsetting the higher cost of oil through bilateral and multilateral 
aid agreements. Thus, OPEC's ODA commitments in the first nine 
months of 1974 amounted to $8.6 billion plus $3.1 billion 
contributed to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) oil facility 
and another $1 billion made available to the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) a total of $12.7 bil-
lion, or 8.8 percent of their GNP, or 20 percent of the so-called 
petrodollar surplus.94 It should be noted, however, that actual dis-
bursements are of necessity lower than the commitments cited 
above. It should be noted also that multilateral commitments by 
OPEC countries were made to a variety of institutions including the 
Islamic Development Bank, Arab Bank for Africa, the Special Arab 
Fund for Africa, the U .N. Emergency Fund, the OPEC Develop-
ment Fund, and several other institutions.95 
I. The Energy Crisis and Company Profits 
The United States experienced a fuel shortage in the winter of 
1972, followed by a gasoline shortage in the spring, prompting most 
analysts to anticipate supply problems in the winter of 1973-7 4. 96 It 
94. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE WORLD ECONOMY, supra note 
14, at 32. 
95. Id. See also IMF SURVEY, Nov. 18, 1974, at 357. One source indicated that in 1974 
Kuwait had contracted financial commitments of over $1 billion with international organiza-
tions, Arab, or Third World Countries. This sum represents 11 percent of Kuwait's GNP. 
During the same year, the bilateral and multilateral financial aid granted by all OPEC 
countries totalled $14.3 billion, of which two-thirds was extended by Arab countries. Of this 
total, about $7 .6 billion was granted in the form of intergovernmental loans at very low 
interest rates. For most OPEC countries, the aid thus granted exceeded 8 percent of their 
own GNP. See ARAB OIL & GAS, Mar. 1, 1975, at 17. 
96. SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 93D CONG., lST SESS., AN ASSESS-
MENT AND ANALYSIS OF THE ENERGY EMERGENCY: A STAFF ANALYSIS PREPARED BY B. COOPER 
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was in this context that the Arab cutbacks and embargo were im-
posed in October 1973. The record indicates that profits of the five 
U.S. majors and five large U.S. domestic companies have signifi-
cantly increased for the period October 1, 1973, to September 30, 
1974. While the majors increased their profits by 56 percent over the 
twelve month period, the domestic companies enjoyed an increase 
of 92 percent in their profits.97 Another set of data indicates that the 
five American majors experienced an increase in their profit of 95 
percent in 1974 over 1972 (from $4 billion to $7 .8 billion), while the 
twelve largest American domestic oil companies were able to in-
crease their profits by 165 percent during the same period (from $1.7 
billion to $4.5 billion). For both groups together the increase was 116 
percent (from $5.7 billion to $12.3 billion).98 
IV. THE QUESTION OF OPEC SURPLUS FUNDS 
The oil price increases created several new conditions for the 
international financial system. In the short run, the pressing issue 
was how to deal with balance of payments deficits which can legiti-
mately be ascribed to oil. In the medium and long terms the ques-
tions raised by the higher oil prices revolve around the size of the 
surplus, the form of its accumulation, and its impact on the stability 
of the international financial system. I shall attempt to deal with 
each of these issues. 
There seems to be a general consensus that OPEC countries 
balance of payments surplus in 1974 ranged between $55 billion and 
$60 billion. The other side of this coin is that this sum represents 
the balance of payments deficit of oil importing countries. Each 
country's deficit would have been eliminated if an equivalent inflow 
of funds had taken place. Instead, there was a considerable degree 
of unevenness in these flows. Of the estimated $60 billion, about $11 
billion (18.3 percent) was directly invested in the United States in 
the form of bank deposits, money market liquid assets, short and 
long term government securities, and a small amount in real estate 
and private securities (less than $1 billion). In addition, at least $21 
billion was invested in the Euro-currency market (mainly Euro-
dollar and sterling), $7.5 billion was directly invested in the United 
Kingdom, $5.5 billion in other industrial countries, $3.5 billion was 
PURSUANT TO S. RES. 45 3 (1973). 
97. MULTINATIONAL OIL CORPORATIONS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 11, at 162. 
98. The author has derived these conclusions from issues of the Petroleum Intelligence 
Weekly published in 1974. 
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lent to international financial institutions (IMF and World Bank), 
and $4 billion was given in grants and loans to developing countries. 
The balance was used for repayment of outstanding debts, net 
private capital movement, and various types of investment through-
out the world.99 It can be readily seen from this data that the bulk 
of OPEC petrodollars was channeled into dollar and sterling finan-
cial assets in amounts that are in excess of the oil deficit of these 
countries. There are several reasons for this phenomenon, including 
the availability of a wide variety of financial instruments (especially 
in the United States), the size of the money and capital markets, 
the lack of restrictions on capital inflow, the traditional ties of 
OPEC money managers to these markets, and (in the case of the 
United States) the size of its economy and the role which the dollar 
plays in international transactions. But, the channeling of these 
funds into the financial markets of the United States and the United 
Kingdom meant that the money did not go where the deficits were. 
This situation called for secondary recycling, a task that was left to 
various financial institutions to handle. It should be emphasized 
again that solutions to balance of payments problems will have to 
vary from one country to another depending on the underlying eco-
nomic forces which determine each country's international position. 
Thus, while the performance of the German economy is such that 
it continues to show current account surplus in spite of heavy de-
pendence on oil imports, the United Kingdom's payments position 
is remedied by capital inflow. Italy, on the other hand, does not 
have the strong economy which Germany has nor the financial mar-
kets of the United States and the United Kingdom. This asymmetry 
explains to a considerable degree the efforts of France, Italy, and 
Japan to conclude bilateral trade agreements with oil producing 
countries to lessen and eventually eliminate their deficits by ex-
panding their export markets. 
The first effect of the oil price rise is the size of the surplus 
which OPEC countries will be able to accumulate. Forecasts as to 
the size of the surplus depend on the assumptions used. These as-
sumptions include oil prices, rates of economic growth in industrial 
countries, price and income elasticities of demand for oil, availabil-
ity and price of substitutes, the cohesiveness of OPEC, and the 
increase in producing countries' imports for current consumption 
and development purposes. It goes without saying that the larger 
99. 1975 ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 195; IMF SURVEY, Mar. 24, 1975, at 81. 
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the margin of error in each one of these variables, the more uncer-
tain the estimate of the size of the surplus will be. Thus, the World 
Bank had put OPEC surpluses after 1980 at an annual rate of $100 
billion, with accumulated external assets growing from $650 billion 
in 1980 to $1.2 trillion in 1985. 100 The World Bank estimates gave 
rise to doomsday predictions that the oil producers, chiefly the Arab 
states and Iran, would be able to buy up an enormous portion of the 
rest of the world unless something were done to stop them. 101 The 
OECD, on the other hand, computed the surplus at only $15 billion 
by 1980, with accumulated external assets of $300 billion. 102 Morgan 
Guaranty Trust Company's estimates indicate that the OPEC pe-
trodollar available for investment had already reached its peak in 
1974, will decline to $17 billion in 1978, and turn into a deficit 
thereafter. External assets will also peak at $248 billion in 1978, 
declining to $179 billion by 1980. 103 Several factors lead me to place 
more faith in the Morgan Guaranty's estimates than in the World 
Bank's. These include the facts that: (1) the current absolute dec-
line in oil output and the expected slowdown in its rate of growth; 
(2) as economic development accelerates in oil producing countries, 
domestic expenditures and imports will rise; and (3) inflation in 
industrial countries will wipe out a sizable portion of these funds. 
Thus, a recent study prepared by the Economic Research Institute 
for the Middle East (Tokyo) concludes that if prices are allowed to 
keep rising at an annual rate of 11 percent in 1975, as is estimated 
by OECD, the import price index in the fourth quarter of 1975 for 
the OPEC countries will increase by 36.4 percent above its level in 
the same quarter in 1973. Such development will have the effect of 
reducing the real value of the $10.12 barrel government take to 
$7.42. 104 To put OPEC petrodollars in perspective, it should be noted 
that some $268 billion of short-term assets were held at the end of 
1971 by private institutions on the international financial scene and 
the lion's share of the money was controlled by U.S.-based multina-
tional companies and banks. 105 As to the probable destabilizing ef-
100. N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1975, at 50, col. 3; IMF SURVEY, Jan. 20, 1975, at 30. 
101. N .Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1975, at 50, col. 3. 
102. Ao Hoc COMM. ON THE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL MONETARY EFFECT OF ENERGY 
AND OTHER NATURAL RESOURCE PRICING, HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 930 CONG., 
2D SESS., BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS ADJUSTMENTS TO HIGHER OIL PRICES: MANAGING THE PETRO-
DOLLAR PROBLEM 15 (1975) [hereinafter cited as BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS ADJUSTMENTS TO 
HIGHER OIL PRICES]. 
103. MEES, Jan. 31, 1975, at 8. 
104. MEES Supp., Feb. 21, 1975, at 1-3. 
105. Wall St. J., Feb. 13, 1973, at 2, col. 3. 
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fects of the petrodollar, both historical and current evidence indi-
cates that the OPEC money managers are rather conservative and 
not prone to speculative activities. As a matter of fact, OPEC coun-
tries holding reserves in dollars suffered losses estimated at $1.3 
billion in the dollar devaluations of 1971 and 1973. Those holding 
sterling reserves took losses in the 1967 devaluation of the pound. 106 
In light of such experiences and in view of prevailing economic 
conditions, one can easily see why OPEC countries with surpluses 
have chosen short-term instead of long-term forms of investment. 
It can also be seen why they are anxious to obtain protection against 
exchange rate risk. Speculation in the foreign exchange market is 
no longer free of risks, as was the case under the fixed exchange rate 
system of the Bretton Woods era. This is so because under the 
current floating exchange rates system, any massive shift from one 
currency to another will tend to move the exchange rates fairly 
quickly, before the shift is completed, causing a loss of value on the 
funds still held in the depreciating currency. In other words, the 
threat of sufficiently rapid and extensive rate fluctuations is such 
that the floating exchange rate system will discourage large desta-
bilizing shifts among currencies. 107 Once these risks are neutralized, 
it is only logical, from the viewpoint of a money manager, that the 
governing assumption of his investment policy should be to acquire 
those assets that are at least as valuable as oil in the ground. Given 
this assumption, it is rather difficult to differentiate between the 
objectives of an Arab money manager and any other manager whose 
investment strategy is to seek a portfolio which should emphasize 
stability, growth, and diversification.1°8 
Given the available evidence and data and relating the size of 
these funds to the size of international financial transactions, one 
must conclude that the so-called petrodollar funds do not pose the 
danger which many people thought (or still may think) they posed 
to the international financial system. On the contrary, these funds 
should be viewed as an important source of capital formation at a 
time when practically every country in the world is in need of such 
financial resources. It is useful to remember that, in spite of their 
recently acquired control over their oil resources, the OPEC coun-
106. BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS ADJUSTMENTS TO HIGHER OIL PRICES, supra note 102, at 22-
23. 
107. Id. at 23. 
108. See Statement by Gerald L. Parsky, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, before the 
Senate Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1975) . 
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tries, like all raw material producers, continue to be dependent on 
the markets of the developed economies for their exports and their 
imports. This state of dependency will continue, I believe, for the 
foreseeable future. 
Finally, it has been noted that these accumulated external as-
sets, when converted into goods and services, will result in a massive 
transfer of wealth to the OPEC countries. This is true, of course. 
This observation, however, confuses the mutual transfer of real re-
sources; which takes place through international trade or the ex-
change of exports for imports, and the transfer of resources at two 
different points in time. The conversion of external assets into real 
resources in the future is simply no more than a postponement of 
resource transfer. Had the economies of OPEC countries been capa-
ble of absorbing all the resources which their oil exports could buy, 
the problems/issues of petrodollars, deficits, accumulation of exter-
nal assets, and their future conversion would not have presented 
themselves in the first place. 
V. THE CURRENT DEBATE: SOME OBSERVATIONS 
Presently there are two sets of debates occurring concurrently: 
one within OPEC, and the other within the industrial countries 
through their International Energy Agency (IEA). Although both 
groups seem to have arrived at certain common positions, differ-
ences among the members of each group have by no means been 
settled. OPEC's position, as reflected in the deliberations at the 
recent summit conference in Algeria, is as follows: the basic cause 
of the world economic crisis is the profound economic inequality 
between developed and developing countries, an inequality which 
had been caused by foreign exploitation and drainage of the natural 
resources of developing countries. The problem was further aggra-
vated by inflation, recession, and instability in the international 
monetary system. The general tendency in developed countries to 
consume and waste excessive amounts of scarce resources had only 
exacerbated the problem. Any meaningful dialogue and/or negotia-
tions with the developed countries should not be confined to the 
question of energy, but should also deal with the problems of other 
raw material producing countries, the reform of the international 
monetary system, and international cooperation in aiding economic 
development. 109 This position, I might add, is an attempt to trans-
109. See Solemn Declaration by the Conference of the Sovereigns and Heads of State of 
the OPEC Member Countries, Algiers, Mar. 4-6, OPEC/Sl/l.Rev.1, published in OPEC 
40
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 3, No. 2 [1975], Art. 5
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol3/iss2/5
1975] Petrodollar Overview 407 
late into action the International Development Strategy for the Sec-
ond United Nations Development Decade109·1 and the Declaration 
and Programme of Action Concerning the Establishment of a New 
International Economic Order adopted by the Sixth Special Session 
of the United Nations General Assembly in May 1974.109·2 The core 
of OPEC's strategy towards the industrial countries involves these 
elements: (1) stabilization of oil prices; (2) a guarantee to supply oil 
to meet their requirements; and (3) direct recycling of 
petrodollars to the m·ost affected industrial countries. uo This last 
point is important when viewed within the context of the American 
plan for a $25 billion safety net which will be discussed below. In 
return for these three guarantees, OPEC would like the industrial 
countries to commit themselves to the following: (1) an end to 
threats, confrontation tactics, and any designs for military and eco-
nomic aggression; (2) an equitable relationship between oil prices 
and prices of OPEC countries' imports; (3) appropriate pricing 
schemes for other Third World raw materials other than oil; (4) a 
reformed international monetary system which would allow for the 
active participation in decision making by the Third World; (5) a 
moratorium on barriers to the free movement of oil or the employ-
ment of financial assets; and (6) a serious effort by industrial coun-
tries to boost the economic development of the Third World through 
the transfer of technology and the opening up of markets to the 
products of Third World industries. 111 Within OPEC, the differences 
evolve around the issues of production regulation, the timing of oil 
price indexing to reflect inflation, the administration and employ-
ment of surplus funds, and the extent to which OPEC should link 
oil to other raw materials in its dealings with the industrial coun-
tries.112 
WEEKLY BULLETIN, Mar. 10, 1975, at 1. For an illuminating analysis of these issues see ARAB 
OIL & GAS, Feb. 1, 1975, at 3; ARAB OIL & GAS, Mar. 1, 1975, at 3; ARAB OIL & GAS, Mar. 16, 
1975, at 3. 
109.1. G.A. Res. 2626, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 39, U.N. Doc. A/8124 & Add. 1. 
109.2. Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. 
Res. 3201; Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New Economic Order, G.A. Res. 
3202. 
110. See MEES SUPP., Jan. 31, 1975; MEES SUPP., Mar. 7, 1975; ARAB OIL & GAS, Mar. 
16, 1975, at 3. 
111. See MEES SUPP., Jan. 31, 1975; MEES SUPP., Mar. 7, 1975; ARAB 01L & GAS, Mar. 
16, 1975, at 3. 
112. For an analysis of these conflicts see MEES SUPP., Mar. 7, 1975; ARAB 01L & GAS, 
Mar. 16, 1975, at 3. 
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The developed countries, under the leadership of the United 
States, have changed their position from one which sought a reduc-
tion in OPEC oil prices to the current position which seeks to estab-
lish a floor price for oil. Their position-except for the United 
States-has also changed with respect to coping with balance of 
payments deficits. The initial position was that the IMF oil facility 
should be significantly expanded to meet the payments needs of 
both developing and developed countries. The U.S. position, on the 
other hand, was that such a facility will have the effect of keeping 
oil prices from falling. While the IMF oil facility is being kept for 
the present, the industrial countries agreed to adopt the U.S. pro-
posal to create a $25 billion safety net outside the IMF as a solidar-
ity fund to finance payments deficits and have also agreed on cer-
tain measures relating to conservation, oil sharing, and stockpiling. 
While tactics have changed, the overall strategy of the Ameri-
can energy policy remains the same, that is, a reduction in demand 
for oil will force OPEC countries to increase production or lower 
prices at the time when their ambitious defense and development 
programs get underway. In the meantime the industrial coun-
tries-mainly the United States-are to embark upon a massive and 
costly effort to develop new energy sources whose cost of production 
can never compete with the production costs of Middle East oil. 113 
This disparity in production cost poses a dilemma. In order to pro-
tect the major capital investment that is needed to bring oil prices 
down, the United States must insure that the price of oil on the 
domestic market does not fall below a certain level. In other words, 
in order to bring OPEC prices down major oil importing countries 
must not allow imported oil, that is, OPEC oil, to be sold domesti-
cally below certain levels. 114 This in turn means that domestic prices 
should be kept at a level that would make capital investment for 
the development of the higher cost alternative sources profitable. 
Such a floor price for imported oil, if implemented-through tariffs, 
quotas, or variable levels-will permanently keep energy prices at 
a high level. This outcome will be in line with traditional domestic 
oil policy which sought over the last 40 years to keep oil prices at 
an artificially high level. The idea of a floor price suffers from a basic 
113. Energy: The Necessity of Decision, Address by Henry A. Kissinger, National Press 
Club, Washington, Feb. 3, 1975. It should be noted that Otmar Emminger believes that the 
$25 billion safety net involved reshuffling of reserves, and did not have much to do with the 
petrodollars. 
114. Id. 
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inconsistency, in that a true protection for other forms of energy 
would be higher than the present oil price, and that a lower oil price 
would not provide the necessary price for alternative sources. 
Aside from the safety net and mutual sharing of oil, the domes-
tic impact of the Ford Administration energy program was assessed 
to be very similar to the impact of the 1973 OPEC oil price increases 
at a time when the U.S. economy is suffering from both inflation 
and recession. 115 In the absence of economic justification for such a 
policy, one can safely conclude that the motive behind it is the 
perception that the United States is in a crisis that threatens na-
tional prestige and basic foreign policy interests. In commenting on 
this policy, Professor Samuelson said, "[T]he whole problem can 
disappear for the immediate time horizon if President Ford will 
open his eyes and repeat firmly: There is no energy crisis. Repeat: 
There is no energy crisis. Dr. Kissinger's Ph.D. was earned in the 
field of political science, not economics." 116 
Aside from the adverse domestic impact, the U.S. energy policy 
creates serious problems for other industrial countries. There is a 
widely held belief by many European monetary authorities that the 
United States had, due to its chronic balance of payments deficits, 
enormous inflationary impact, and that for several countries the 
inflow of short-term capital had meant the complete loss of control 
over money supply. In Germany, for example, monetary policy was 
practically paralyzed by such inflows-or the threat of them-from 
1968 to 1973.117 Since U.S. energy policy was viewed as a new factor 
contributing to inflation, it was only natural to question the com-
monality of interests between this country and its trading partners 
in Europe. Given the fact that alternative sources were to be devel-
oped in this country, the American plan was viewed as an instru-
ment for the development in this country of the higher cost alterna-
tive sources which will make the United States a major energy ex-
porter supplying a significant share of the world's energy needs. 118 
This, of course, is not the case with Europe. According to Guido 
Carli, Governor of the Bank ofltaly, the energy situation and inter-
115. N. Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1975, sec. 3, at 10, col. 1. 
116. Samuelson, Energy Policy, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 24, 1975, at 76. In his earlier comment 
on the Administration's energy program, Samuelson said the program is "the work of boy 
economist Henry Kissinger." He went on to say that "some are tone deaf to economics. 
Kissinger is not cut out to understand economics. He is promising us a high price of energy 
for a long time to come." N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1975, at 53, col. 3. 
117. 0. EMMINGER, INFLATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 19 (1973) . 
118. State of the Union Address, Jan. 15, 1975, 121 CONG. REC. 136 (1975). 
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es ts of Italy, France, and other Wes tern European countries are 
different from those of the United States, and that European-
American interdependence should be reduced rather than in-
creased. Furthermore, the Europeans will have to pay the same high 
prices, whether to Middle East oil producers or to the Americans 
with their alternative energy sources, without any appreciable ad-
vantage.119 This conflict of interests between the United States, on 
the one hand, and Europe and Japan, on the other, may be ex-
plained by several factors. First, the United States is much less 
dependent on foreign oil than other industrial countries. U.S. oil 
imports constituted 36 percent of its oil needs in 1973 as compared 
with 100 percent for Japan and close to 98 percent for the Common 
Market countries. The oil interdependence between OPEC major 
producing regions (the Middle East and North Africa) and the con-
suming countries is revealed by the fact that in 1973 the United 
States' imports from these two regions amounted to 19.4 percent of 
its total oil imports (or seven percent of total oil consumption), as 
compared with Japan's 76 percent and Western Europe's 84.3 per-
cent. By looking at the same data from a different side we find that 
these two producing regions exported five percent of their oil to 
the United States, as compared with 75 percent to Japan and Eu-
rope. This oil interdependency explains why Japan and Western 
Europe were anxious to conclude bilateral trade agreements with 
the producing countries. Given the fact that an insignificant 
amount of oil flows from the Middle East to the United States, and 
given the reality of the U.S. position as a world power, it follows that 
the U.S. interest in oil and the Middle East is more political than 
economic in terms of its deep involvement with Israel and its pos-
ture vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. By contrast, Europe and Japan have 
little at stake in a political sense, but an overwhelming economic 
interest in that area. Hence, the price for them of any bungled 
confrontation with the oil producers under the U.S. leadership may 
prove to be too high. 120 This asymmetry of interests and oil interde-
pendence may explain why OPEC has offered assurances on produc-
tion, the future stability of oil prices, and the recycling of petrodol-
lars to those developed countries with balance of payments difficul-
ties. Should OPEC succeed in reaching an agreement on the direct 
recycling of some of its funds to the most affected industrial coun-
119. N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1975, at 43, col. 1. 
120. See MEES, Jan. 31, 1975, at 5. 
44
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 3, No. 2 [1975], Art. 5
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol3/iss2/5
1975] Petrodollar Overview 411 
tries, the Kissinger $25 billion safety net will be at least partially 
neutralized. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
1. The energy crisis was the culmination of several long-term 
forces in the oil industry, as evidenced by shortages which appeared 
before the politically-motivated cutback and embargo measures 
imposed by the Arab states in the October 1973 war. These mea-
sures had the effect of accentuating an already existing shortage 
situation. 
2. OPEC, which is an intergovernmental body with no su-
pranational authority or power over its members is not, in my view, 
a cartel. OPEC has not so far sold less than would be in its economic 
interest in order to raise the price. Nor has OPEC resorted to output 
controls through prorating or an agreed reduction by a major produ-
cer. OPEC's preferred instruments instead have been taxes and/or 
prices. 121 
3. OPEC's failure in the 1960's to adopt a unified position to 
raise oil prices led not only to the wasteful use of a scarce resource, 
but also to massive transfer of wealth to the developed countries due 
to inflation and international monetary stability. 
4. The importance of the size of the so called "surplus funds" 
or "petrodollars" has, in my opinion, been blown out of proportion. 
The funds have found their way back to the most important capital 
markets. The financial markets, through their function of interme-
diation, engaged in secondary recycling by channeling these funds 
to those deficit countries which did not receive funds directly. 
5. OPEC countries' economic aid to developing countries ex-
ceeds by several times that provided by industrial countries relative 
to GNP. This is true with respect to both aid commitments and 
actual disbursement. 
6. Although oil price increases were sudden and steep, a sig-
nificant part of the increase-almost one-third-had already been 
wiped out due to inflation and currency depreciation. 
7. OPEC, I believe, can and should play a major role in chang-
ing a world economic order in which 72 percent of the population 
receive 17 percent of the income while the other 28 percent of the 
population receive 83 percent of the income. OPEC countries, with 
10 percent of the world population and less than four percent of its 
121. See Mabro, Can OPEC Hold the Line, MEES SUPP., Feb. 28, 1975. 
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income, are part of the Third World, but I must add that they have 
a unique opportunity to make a positive contribution for the eco-
nomic development of the less developed countries. 
8. In view of the intimate relationship between the major oil 
companies and their home governments and the role which the ma-
jors played as instruments of foreign policy, and in view of the recent 
shift of economic power to oil producers, it is not surprising to find 
Dr. Kissinger saying that we should act to regain control of our 
future and Mr. Simon saying that we should act decisively in the 
face of our national security threat to regain control of our economic 
destiny. 
9. The central and critical objective of every OPEC country 
is to use an exhaustible resource as a catalyst for the transformation 
of their underdeveloped economies into economies capable of pro-
viding employment and decent life for future generations. A recent 
study by the National Academy of Sciences posed the issue very 
clearly by predicting that the oil reserves in the Middle East will 
be gone in 30 years at the present and prospective rates of use. The 
study went on to say that, "The Arab countries are entitled to ask 
themselves, and us, what kind of economy and culture they will 
have achieved by the time this transient bounty runs out." 122 
122. Quoted in N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1975, at 12, col. 3. 
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